Mediatized politics is often associated with a metamorphosis of politics; a shift from philosophical fermentations to effective media campaigning and from rational argumentation to personal appeals, sound-bites and dramatic effects. The question this article raises is whether this alleged metamorphosis allows some space for ideology to emerge and play any role in contemporary politics and, if so, what the implications for the study of political ideology in the age of mediatization are? As I will argue, to study ideology in the context of mediatized politics is not to make big claims about the survival or demise of some 'grand' belief systems but to analytically address the potential of political discourse, as it is articulated through several media genres within specific socio-political contexts, to re-contextualize symbolisms from the past serving the effective exercise of political power in the present. I will further illustrate this attempted revisionism by briefly examining three televised political advertisements, which I take as an example of mediatized politics,
Introduction
This article has a dual goal: it argues that mediatized politics, albeit pragmatically driven and aesthetically/emotionally ridden 1 , may be still ideological; and, by virtue of doing so, it makes the claim that ideological politics in the age of mediatization can no longer be studied while taking for granted the essentialist conceptions with which ideology has been, extensively, bestowed so far. I particularly refer here to the conception of ideology, widely popular and influential in political theory and science, as rational sets of ideas, with closed and rigid structures, that articulate a normative view of politics and its relation to the society (what society has to look like and how politics can contribute to the realization of this ideal); a conception that is often, for the sake of brevity, referred as 'belief systems' 2 .
The mediatization of politics, as I will argue in the first part of this article, appertains to a metamorphosis of political discourse (personalization, conversationalization, dramatization) which, albeit overstated and often misinterpreted, is quite far from the Enlightenment ideal of 'proper' political discourse (abstraction, raison d'être, purity) 3 , Ideology, however, has been linked to this essentialist concern about rationality and consistency in political discourse as much as it has been linked to the pragmatic concern about the effective exercise of power through political discourse 4 . As Sartori has succinctly put it 'this is, it seems to me, the single major reason that ideology is so important to us. We are concerned about ideologies because we are concerned, in the final analysis, with the power of man over man, with how populations and nations can be mobilized and manipulated […]' 5 . From this point of view, mediatized politics could be intrinsically ideological since media are said to constitute the primary locus where political power is symbolically claimed and contested in late modern societies 6 .
It is, however, the personal appeals, sound-bites and dramatic effects rather than the rational belief systems that symbolically facilitate the exercise of power through the media 7 . By this token, the following dilemma seems to emerge: what weighs more as 'ideological' in contemporary politics: the adherence to belief systems developed at some point in historyparticularly, those that emerged in the late eighteenth and that, in the course of the nineteenth century, were subsequently acclaimed as the 'grand narratives' that shaped politics in the twentieth century, such as liberalism, conservatism, socialism, communism, etc. 8 -or the use of any symbolic form in so far us it is oriented at serving the exercise of power? 9 As I will illustrate in greater depth in the second and third parts of this article, this is a pseudodilemma as it is not particular (rationalist and cohesive or bombastic and dissimulative) ideas that are implanted with the privilege of enacting certain patterns of political (self)representation and mobilizing certain forms of political action but, generally, the historicity of discourse, by virtue of its re-contextualizing principle. Discourse, by appropriating and realigning different ideas, concepts and practices of symbolic meaning from the past, within specific socioinstitutional contexts, gives rise to new regimes of meaning, and in doing so, it (re)organises and (re)orders current political practice in these contexts 10 . Re-contextualization has been found, in one way or another, to be a constitutive aspect even of the alleged 'grand' ideologies of the twentieth century 11 and needs, therefore, to be located in the heart of the concept of
Ideology as such.
If we understand ideology, as is proposed here, as a discursive practice of re-contextualization of symbolisms from the past, then, the ideological potential of mediatized political discourse is neither a priori impossible nor de facto possible; it rather becomes a matter of analysis of the generic and contextual aspects of mediatized politics. Do specific generic properties allow symbolisms from the past to emerge in media platforms, such as political advertising, which I 4 take as my empirical point of reference? Do these symbolisms hold any relevance to the historical itinerary of political institutions, such as political parties? Do re-contextualized symbolisms play any role in the current context, in respect of the challenges and opportunities the latter raises for the institutions, and how they perform this role discursively?
These are questions to be put at the centre of the ideological analysis of mediatized politics, turning our attention from the out-of-touch grand narratives of mega-politics to the palpable practices of political communication as they are discursively enacted in different media genres and develop within different socio-institutional contexts. In the last part of this article, I will try to grapple with these questions by taking televised political advertising as an example of mediatized politics and examining its different generic rubrics, such as the 'talking head', 'man-in-the-street' and 'cinéma-vérité' genres, within different institutional contexts -the In the age of media's institutional autonomy and technological advancement and sophistication, mediatization is, therefore, effectively taken to entail the colonization of political logic by the media logic 16 .
Other than these media-centric developments, several socio-political processes, potentially related to, but by no means exhausted through the media, are also considered to have paved the way for the triumph of media logic. Among these processes is the growing 're-secularization'
and 'managerialization' of politics, in the postwar period, that is, the gradual disentanglement of the major political parties in Western democracies from the passionate ideational tensions and anchorages of the past (e.g. liberalism vs. conservatism or liberalism vs. communism) and their convergence toward a more or less moderate and pragmatist approach to politics that is immersed in the search for workable policies and electable party positions (e.g. Third Way politics) 17 .
Re-secularization of politics is also fostered by the waning of class-cleavages which, inevitably, has deprived political parties of a solid base of support, and the constantly increasing disaffection of the electorate as a result of both the managerial turn of politics and the decline of 'class politics' 18 . In such a destabilized and fluid socio-political terrain, the 20 . Closely related, the conversationalizing trend emanates from media proclivity to represent politics as a conversational routine, framed with phrases from the quotidian vocabulary in the form of sound-bites, providing, therefore, more space for an 'episodic' than a 'thematic' coverage of issues 21 . Finally, dramatization is attributed to media's tendency to invest representation with a dramatic tone, highlighting conflictual, extravagant and grandiose aspects of events which, ultimately, construe politics as a spectacle 22 .
Personalization, conversationalization and dramatization are trends detectable, more or less, in all the patterns through which politics is represented in different media platforms (news broadcasts, political advertising, political debates and interviews, etc.) and in practices through which the political is constructed as an identity and form of action beyond media platforms (in the way political actors frame their speeches in rallies, conventions, even closed-door caucuses and in the ways they professionally stage themselves when they are exposed in public venues).
In the age of mediatized politics, the former fuse into the latter traversing the whole ontology of politics. 24 .
Even if we accept the argument that the three aforementioned trends have been intensified and invested with different qualities in the age of mediatization 25 , the hypothesis of a single and unitary media logic that colonizes politics is still unsustainable. Not all these trends are ascribed the same qualities across different media formats and socio-institutional contexts. Sensational and dramatist framing of politics, for instance, has been reported to significantly vary between the tabloid press and the classic broadsheets 26 , as well as, personal appeals have been argued to find a more fertile ground in the social media than in the party official websites and forums 27 .
On the other hand, the 'raw materials' out of which telegenic leadership is fashioned, for instance, are drawn on symbolic conventions and structures that are already salient in the political culture of each context, such as the Gaullist legacy of the heroic leader in the French right-wing UMP 28 . 
Pragmatism and historicity in mediatized politics: the re-contextualizing principle of discourse
One of the most debated political projects in the age of mediatization is the so-called 'New
Labour' project in the UK, which emerged within the general euphoria around Third Way politics, as a pragmatically driven response to the socio-economic demands and challenges of the new, complex, highly interdependent and unpredictable world, beyond the dogmatic anchorages of neoliberalism and social democracy 29 . As Tony Blair, the man whose name has become synonymous with the New Labour project (Blairite politics), once put it 'The 21 st century will not be a battle around ideology. But it will be a struggle for progress. Guided not by dogmatic ideology but by pragmatic ideals' 30 . Blair and the other 'pragmatists' are right in arguing that in the age of diversification, multiculturalism, globalization and, I would add, mediatization, politics is not adhered to any specific belief system or grand narrative of the past. At the same time, however, the lack of consistency and historical determinism cannot be taken to amount to the eradication from new political projects of beliefs, ideas and other symbolic fragments of the past. This is something that neither Blair nor any other pragmatist politician would eagerly endorse.
The New Labour project, for instance, within its market-oriented and highly personalized (Blairite) rhetoric, managed to rearticulate concepts of 'justice' and 'equality', inherited from I take here historicity to grasp both the historically conditioned or, simply historical, nature of discourse, referred to by Kristeva as the 'insertion of history into text', and the historically constitutive or historicizing capacity of discourse, the 'insertion of text into history', in her terms 34 , and I see both these aspects imbricating within the re-contextualizing principle of discourse. By re-contextualization I mean the disarticulation and dis-embedding of concepts, ideas, discourses and practices from the socio-historical contexts in which they were originally produced and/or chronically reproduced, and their re-articulation and re-embedding into new contexts 35 . By virtue of its re-contextualizing principle, discourse carries with it the sociohistorical referents and implications of the de-contextualized practices (historical aspect) while, at the same time, by resituating the latter within new socio-institutional and, therewith, semantic contexts, it inevitably transforms their meaning (historicising aspect) 36 .
Discourse appears, therefore, always to precede the emergence of specific institutional practices circumscribing the space within which individuals and groups can understand and self-define themselves as political subjects (identity-making), understand and define the political reality within which they have to act (representation) and, eventually, understand and define the available means and ways of acting (action-mobilization) 37 . Arguably, such an approach to political discourse is primarily informed by post-structuralist discourse theory and, at this point, it is necessary to refer to the implications this raises for the attempted reconceptualization of ideology as re-contextualization.
Post-structuralist discourse-political theory: towards an understanding of ideology as the re-contextualizing potential of mediatized politics
The post-structuralist social theory of discourse takes as its point of departure the 'radical contingency', ongoing fluidity and complexity, that traverses late modern societies and comes to suggest that discourse, by ascribing a particular, relatively fixed, meaning, to concepts that are principally 'empty signifiers' (without any immanent meaning), gives rise to social practices through which the fluidity of the social is temporarily organized and ordered 38 . The discursive ordering of the social, however, if anything, mystifies the very condition of radical contingency that traverses the latter; discourse construes social relations as effectively fixated and consolidated while, in principle, they are open-ended and precarious. This 'ontological misrecognition' of social relations as givens in the regimes of meaning that discourse creates, crucially, differs from the Marxist 'epistemological misrecognition' of social relations as classless and eternal in the (false) consciousness of the working class; but it is still taken by discourse theorists (through a rather neo-Marxist/Gramscian prism) to establish and sustain the domination of a cluster of (class, gendered, nationalist, etc.) interests in the form of hegemony 39 .
Political science, being rather hostile to post-structuralist discourse theory, has not yet systematically embarked on debates around re-contextualization and its relevance to the study of ideology, although there have been significant initiatives to this direction. Michael Freeden's work on the 'conceptual morphology' of ideologies 40 could be an exemplar in this regard.
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Freeden espouses the post-structuralist principle of radical contingency, which he construes as inherent indeterminacy and contestability of political discourse, thereby rejecting the essentialist conception of ideology as a doctrinaire belief system. Quite the contrary, he argues that although concrete ideologies are usually treated and studied as set of ideas, ideology, in its conceptual generality, is the process of producing political ideas through the effective decontestation of political meaning. In other words, what in post-structuralist discourse theory described as the ordering capacity of discourse, Freeden perceives as 'a wide-ranging structural arrangement 'that attributes meaning to a range of mutually defining political concepts' 41 without, however, ever resulting in a total decontestation of political discourse.
From this point of view, ideologies may be seen as (discursive) formations, relatively openended and porous in their boundaries (permeability), with their concepts acquiring meaning always in relation to other concepts that are closely linked to them 42 or, as I would put it, in recontextualizing terms, in relation to the context within which they are resituated. Some of these concepts, Freeden suggests, are 'core' and, therefore, ineliminable and some others are 'adjacent' and 'peripheral' and, therefore, subject to change (priority) 43 , a principle which reminds us that discourse by re-contextualizing ideas and practices, simultaneously, (re)orders and organises them. Finally, Freeden draws our attention to the fact that some concepts are allotted relatively more space than others in an ideology (proportionality) 44 . That is, crucially, a matter of inclusion and exclusion of certain socio-historical referents, and of their topical connotations, in the process of re-contextualization.
Freeden, however, does not espouse the 'Manichaeism' of post-structuralist discourse theory to treat everything as discourse, and, therewith, the alleged capacity of discourse to establish a single and universal hegemony. He, instead, stresses that we need seriously to take into account the subjects' agency over discourse 45 , that is, the instrumental use of discourse by political actors, as a means of pursuing their specific institutional interests and goals, in a variety of 12 different and unexpected ways that do not necessarily result in establishing and sustaining a hegemonic order 46 .
Although I warmly defend Freeden's scepticism about the concept of hegemony, I wish to argue that it is important to retain the critical element of discourse theory acknowledging that discourse, as already mentioned, through re-contextualizing ideas and practices, carries with it social-historical referents that are imbricated with (multiple and permeable rather than single and rigid) asymmetries and relations of domination, which subjects, regardless of whether they are aware of them or not, may serve and sustain while drawing on certain discursive As we can conclude from the preceding discussion, the re-contextualizing principle, and its power-making implications is, crucially, a 'tropism' of political discourse in general and of media discourse in particular 49 ; it does not render, however, mediatized politics necessarily ideological. As we have seen, drawing on Freeden's conceptual morphology, ideologies are characterised by some ineliminable core concepts of historical relevance to political institutions or other groups (not of concepts and ideas in general) and serve the exercise of power by these specific groups and institutions (not the power over society in general).
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Consequently, as I wish to put it, mediatized discourse is ideological in so far as (a) it recontextualizes concepts which hold a symbolic meaning for a specific social group or institution (symbolisms), that is, concepts related by abstraction and convention to the historical itinerary of this group/institution, and (b) the performed re-contextualization of symbolisms serves the potential of this group/institution to enhance its relational position in a given social context, by justifying, for instance, its specific strategies and pursuits and/or by I shall focus on these analytical categories in greater length using some empirical examples from perhaps the most popular and widespread platform of political communication, televised political advertising, 51 and the one that offers us easy and ample access to the aforementioned dominant trends of representing politics in the age of mediatization 52 .
The ideological potential of mediatized politics: some examples

Generic and contextual options in the case-studies
Genre is a widely recognisable, conventional pattern of representation, '[…] that is associated with and party enacts a socially ratified type of activity' 53 . The broadcasts 54 chosen as examples in my inquiry draw on the three most commonly used in political advertising genres, which discursively instantiate into concrete practices (ratified type of activities) the three major It is important to note here that when I refer to discursive articulation or instantiation (of abstract trends into concrete practices) I mean the meaning-making potential of semiosis in its entirety; not only the purely linguistic material and the cognitive schemata it mobilises (Derridean logocentrism) but also, especially in the age of the multi-generic media discourse, the aesthetic and affective qualities of the ample audio-visual material (multimodality) 58 . As
Freeden has stressed, ideologies nowadays are more effectively disseminated through 'emotional visual symbols […] than rational argument'. 59 Contra to the Enlightenment legacy which has, rather derogatively, relegated the emotive dynamic of aesthetics to the realm of political instincts, a bourgeoning sociology of emotions has highlighted the heuristic effect of affect on the very processes of cognition 60 . 'Affect delimits the emotional potentialities of the image that orient us towards legitimate ways of feeling' 61 and crucially, 'the way we feel structures the way we think and ultimately the way we act' 62 .
Context, in the way understood here, refers to a social site of interaction shaped by the routines, norms and internal logics that are traceable in its micro-genealogy 63 . I take here the American Democratic party as an example of an institutional setting situated in a context the genealogy of which is characterised by the absence of an aristocratic and feudalist ancient regime and, therefore, by the early establishment of a liberal democratic one, the basic principles of which have been espoused by both the two major political parties in the US 64 . I take the British Conservative party (also referred as 'the Tories'), on the other hand, as an example of an institutional setting located in a more fragmented political context. This context has evolved out of the collapse of the ancient regime and the competing forces this collapse unleashed, that is, conservative forces, which have defended the idea of organic society and the return to traditional values, liberal forces, which have enshrined the ideas of individual freedom and self-development, and, later on, socialist and labour forces, which have stood for state protectionism, social justice and union rights 65 .
Finally, I take Greek PASOK as an example of an institutional setting that is grounded in a context of, recently established, parliamentary democracy. This context has been shaped, primarily, by the historical traumas of a late civil war and junta and, more, particularly, by the polarization between some oppressive, militarist and anti-communist forces, identified with the 'evil Right', and some oppressed, anti-Right and pro-communist forces (both without a clear class structure), identified with the 'resistant Left' 66 . These paradigmatically different genealogical characteristics, broadly sketched out above, have given rise to different practices, values and discourses that can be said to be of symbolic meaning for the parties whose political advertisements are examined here. Let me now illustrate what these symbolisms are and how they are related to the current pragmatic concerns of the three parties by discussing the ways they are re-contextualized in the aforementioned generic rubrics. As stressed so far in this paper, language and, hence, the multimodality of semiosis, do not have a mere referential function but a conceptually constitutive one. That commercial, by seeking to convince the viewer that Obama as president will be committed to and driven by America's core values, construes certain social values as a personal lived experience.
Personalizing social values in the 'liberal' way
Accountability and self-reliance, for example, are reconstructed through Obama's personal struggle to make ends meet as a student by taking several jobs and loans, and solidarity in his decision to reject Wall Street jobs to work, instead, for the devastated neighbourhoods of Chicago.
As already noted, personalization in politics has often been deplored as an aesthetic technique that draws attention to personal appeals and differences countering the lack of consistent beliefs, values and vision 68 . In Obama's case, however, personalization plays a role in the and assistants that enable their children to become autonomous and responsible citizens. 71 Lakoff argues that this model has structured liberal democratic thinking in the US, in the sense that the latter equally values freedom, which allows the pursuit of individual dreams, and responsibility and solidarity, which secure the national interest.
Hope and change might have been Obama's 'Trojan Horse' in the primaries but they were not enough to take him to the White House, especially in a context where 'middle-of-the-road' and moderate political projects are more resonant than the radical and erratic ones. 72 Obama's personal career, however, is by no means an exemplar of the 'middle-of-the-road' cliché; an African-American with Muslim name who had openly admitted experimentation with marijuana and cocaine, with Reverend Wright 73 as his mentor, and who had an ambivalent position on the Iraq war and an openly pro-LGBD rights agenda as senator 74 .
Hope, other than a politically powerful word, especially for progressive, democratic and left politics, is also an affective disposition on which Obama chiefly capitalize in this spot. Hope, in the political sociology of emotions, is considered a positive but moderate affective disposition; it does not mobilise voters to act in an immediate and impetuous way but encourages them, first, to favourably process information related to the candidate 75 . In this presidential spot, hope directs attention to the personalized discourse of social values and hence to the information that presents (legitimises) Obama as a man committed to classic and diachronic values of the American democratic tradition so as to dispel the shadows of radicalism hovering over him. In doing so, hope is not related to change but to public reassurance.
Conversationalizing Big Society in the 'conservative' way
In the run-up to the British General Election of 2010, Conservatives under David Cameron's leadership built their campaign upon the so-called 'Big Society' project, which, in the particular electoral broadcast examined here, acquires 'flesh and bones' in the narratives of three ordinary people ('summarized', in the end, as a single meta-narrative by the leader). Particularly, these lay narratives perform a double function in the broadcast, an iconic and a symbolic one. First, the three persons figure in this broadcast as 'iconic' characters in the sense that they are represented in such a way that highlights their 'family resemblance' to a known social subject (iconic meaning) rather than their particular physical similarities with a known individual (indexical meaning) 76 , that is, it highlights these characteristics that allow the viewer to recognise in these characters the three broader social categories that synthesise the Big Society: period as noted earlier, and which has marked the historical itinerary of the party since its outset. 84 Gradually, as the historical traumas of the civil-war and junta faded away and the party started adapting to globalising and modernising imperatives, the culture of resistance degenerated into a vague, but still tremendously popular and influential, ethno-populist imaginary of resistance; an imagined resistance against anything and anyone that could be perceived as a threat to the national and popular sovereignty of Greeks 85 .
In this 'cinéma-vérité' spot, hope and change are embodied once again in the imaginary of resistance, which is construed now, through the 'gladiator metaphor', as an awaited contest and a struggle (leader's voiceover: 'now it's the time to struggle for Greece'; visual representation:
Mr Papandreou enters a weightlifting stadium, crowded with people that applaud and cheer as they are waiting for him to reach the stand of the arena). Metaphors of conflict and battle are widely used in political rhetoric since, except for familiarising the public with complicated and abstract concepts, they impart a dramatic dimension to the narrative that aims at mobilising and polarising voters 86 . In particular, dramatization by stimulating enthusiasm, an emotional state more overwhelming than hope, invites the viewer to empathise with the represented subjects 87 ;
in this case, with the metaphorically represented struggle of the leader. can be said to disorient people from the urgent fiscal problems, 88 such as the substantially increased public debt and deficit of the Greek economy at that time, which could problematize the party's ambitious programme of economic policy (i.e. increase in wages and pensions).
As I have pointed out, indeterminacy and contingency in political discourse are not uncontrollable but managed through the decontesting and ordering conceptual effect of the recontextualization of symbolisms. How does the re-contextualization of the imaginary of resistance manage the indeterminacy around Papandreou's call for struggle? The imaginary of resistance has so far been mentioned in the discourse of PASOK as constructing an enemy, usually external (the West, Europe or foreign forces in general) or internal (the Right, oligarchies or the 'big interests' in general) to the country 89 . In this broadcast there is no hint of an external national enemy, and the internal enemy that Papandreou demonised in his public speeches -the 'evil Right' and its corrupted governance -is absent too.
Arguably, the affective disposition of enthusiasm, stimulated by the crowd's warm welcome to the leader, invites, as already noted, the viewer to empathise with this 'celebrative ritual' rather than identify an enemy. Beyond the enthusiasm of the crowd, however, we can discern the fluctuating emotional state of the leader, revealed primarily by his facial expressions.
Sometimes he looks happy and optimistic and sometimes troubled and uncertain as he gets ready to enter the stadium. This 'backstage' switch from hope to anxiety and vice versa crucially disrupts the celebrative ritual that unfolds 'frontstage', begging for the viewer's attention to (and reflection on) what really concerns the leader, that is, the structural inefficiencies of the Greek state ('it needs work to make our state more efficient'), rather than the current fiscal problems, and, predominately, people's eagerness to change themselves and abandon the practices that are related to these structural inefficiencies ('to overcome ourselves and create the Greece we want').
The 'enemy' we are looking for is not easily spotted, therefore, since it does not lie somewhere 'out there', on the 'other side', but inside our own social selves, for instance in the chronic pathogenies of clientelism (the extra-institutional distribution of benefits based on personal and party affiliations) and hedonism (the mentality in which prosperity is envisaged as an unconditional given lasting forever) that have occasionally been acknowledged by Papandreou and others within the progressive Left as the major causes for the inefficiency of the state and the inertia of civic society 90 .
To sum up, the gladiator metaphor re-contextualizes the imaginary of resistance through two different dramatic motifs. The first dramatic motif is the enthusiast indeterminacy that recontextualizes the imaginary of resistance as an abstract 'struggle for change', which invites the viewer to empathise with the celebratory ritual of the forthcoming victory, thereby dissimulating current problems that would need urgent solutions (e.g. measures of austerity) after the election. The second dramatic motif is the switching dipole of hope and anxiety that re-contextualizes the imaginary of resistance as the 'struggle to change ourselves', which invites the viewer to reflect on, and thereby demystifying, chronic pathogenies that lie behind the current problems.
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Conclusion
In the age of mediatization, politics is widely moulded by the interrelated trends of personalization, conversationalization and dramatization, which, however, do not deterministically derive from any unitary media logic but they are ascribed different aesthetic and affective qualities within different, context-embedded, genres, thereby heightening and leveraging, or neglecting and downplaying, the historicity of political discourse. The images that narrate aspects of Obama's life, for example, and on the basis of which we, as viewers, are invited to assess his moderation and patriotism (through the affective disposition of hope),
personalize social values that can be traced in an imaginary (the 'nurturant parent') with strong roots in the American liberal democratic tradition.
The ideological potential of mediatized politics, inextricably interrelated with the historicity of political discourse, needs therefore to be 'disenchanted'; historicity does not mean cementation of political discourse with closed belief systems and coherent philosophic traditions but recontextualization of 'fragments', potentially antithetic and contradicting, from the past which hold a symbolic meaning for parties or groups. The three lay narratives that conversationalize the Big Society project, for example, re-contextualize several concepts with symbolic meaning for the Conservative party (strong family, self-reliance, growing entrepreneurship) in such a way that, on the one hand, the aspects which are related to the 'nasty' profile of the party (patriarchal remnants, individualism, deified profit-making) are ameliorated and, on the other, the conservative mentality (return to tradition, need for disciplined and responsible individuals rather than 'nanny' governments) is consolidated.
If mediatization and its ramifications need to be taken seriously into account in the study of ideology, informing the reconceptualization of the latter as a re-contextualizing practice, ideology needs also to be taken seriously into account in the study of mediatized politics, 26 illustrating the ways power is effectively exercised through re-contextualization. PASOK, for example, the Greek left-of-centre party, contested an electoral victory in 2009 launching an ambitious and 'extravagant' manifesto that had to be legitimized against the government's (and other national and foreign authorities') assertion for the need of fiscal consolidation. As I showed, examining an electoral broadcast from that campaign, PASOK's discourse claimed legitimacy through the re-contextualization of the ethno-populist imaginary of resistance as a dramatized struggle for eradicating chronic socio-political pathogenies (which are 'revealed'
as the 'real' problems) rather than coping with the current economic exigencies (which are dissimulated).
Ideology, inextricably imbricated with power-making, operates in the age of mediatized politics both in the cognitive and affective dynamics of the personalized, conversationalized and dramatized political discourse by re-contextualizing symbolisms from the past so as to mobilise (or demobilise) and legitimize (or delegitimize), inter alia, certain institutional actions, social asymmetries and relations of domination, in the present. What we as, researchers and analysts, need to do is constantly look for the different forms these dynamics take in different genres and contexts of mediatized politics.
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